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thanks	 to	 its	 leaders’	 ability	 and	willingness	 to	 engage	 in	
compromises	 and/or	 ever	 deeper	 integration.	 Since	 the	
outbreak	of	the	global	 financial	crisis,	however,	overcom-







sions,	 offered	 freely	 or	 under	 pressure	 by	 one	 or	 two	
member	states,	or	even	a small	group	of	them2.	Dissatis-
faction	 associated	 with	 bad	 compromises	 added	 to	 the	














and	 proposing	 new	 paths	 of	 development	 in	 order	 to	
minimize	the	risks	and	turn	challenges	into	opportunities.
Roots of disintegration as mirrored in literature
Concerning	the	origins	of	difficulties	in	Europe,	one	can	
mention	 the	 German	 reunification,	 undermining	 the	 for-
we,	elektronika	–	telekomunikacja,	środki	farmaceutyczne,	apara-
tura	naukowo-badawcza,	maszyny	elektryczne,	chemikalia,	maszy-





se sector),	 państwa	 (government sector),	 ośrodków	 akademickich	
(higher education sector)	 i organizacji	non-profit	(private non-profit 
sector).













6	 Wysoka	 dynamika	 eksportu	 sprzętu	 lotniczego	 i  środków	
farmaceutycznych	była	kontynuowana	także	w I kw.	2017	r.	War-
tość	eksportu	w tych	kategoriach	wzrosła	łącznie	o ponad	70%	r/r,	








głównymi	 producentami	 tych	 wyrobów	 w  Unii	 Europejskiej	 są	
korporacje	 spoza	 Europy,	 które	 otworzyły	 tu	 swoje	 filie	 w  celu	
zwiększania	sprzedaży	na	rynki	krajów	europejskich,	a ich	produk-
cja	de facto	zastępuje	import.	Ponadto	w celu	podniesienia	konku-
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European	but	 also	 the	broader	 international	 community,	
the	most	important	change	to	consider	was	the	economic	
paradigm	 shift	 away	 from	 Keynesianism	 and	 postwar	
social	contract	between	business	and	labour	towards	the	
new	concept	of	neoliberalism,	with	extensive	liberalisation,	
privatization	 and	 deregulation,	 tax	 cuts	 favouring	 the	










a  mature,	 formalized	 multilateral	 cooperation	 of	 states	
first	came	up	about	the	Eastern	European	integration,	bet-
ter	known	as	Comecon6	(Roaf	et	al.	2014;	East	and	Pontin,	




the	USD)	 in	 the	 trade	among	 the	member	states	 in	1991	
(East	and	Pontin,	2016).	Cooper	(1999)	states	that	disinte-
gration	usually	begins	with	a loss	of	legitimacy	of	the	cen-












fully	manage	also	 serious	 crises	within	 the	 framework	of	
the	European	integration,	thus	providing	almost	no	clarifi-
cations	for	European	disintegration	–	can	explain	why	only	
some	 very	 few	 single	 papers	 (e.g.	 Vollaard,	 2008;	 Auer,	





its	exhaustive	summary	of	 relevant	 literature.	 It	presents	
an	 inventory	of	theories	rooted	 in	different	schools	–	 like	
realism	 (Mearsheimer	 1990),	 federalism	 (Riker,	 1964,	
Franck,	 1968),	 (neo-)	 functionalism	 (Mitrany,	 1966;	 Haas,	
1968),	 transactionalism	 (Deutsch	 et	 al.,	 1957;	 Sandholtz	









chapter	 to	 Rokkan’s	 ideas7	 on	 polity-	 (re)formation	 (Rok-
kan,	1999),	Vollaard	tries	to	offer	a synthesis	of	some	(then)	
more	 recent	 research	 (e.g.	 Maier,	 2002;	 Caporaso	 and	
Jupille,	 2004;	 Bartolini,	 2005).	 He	 concludes	 that	 the	 pat-
terns	 of	 integration	 and	 disintegration	 being	 not	 evenly	
distributed	across	the	EU,	 it	seems	unlikely	the	European	
Union	would,	at	 least	 in	 the	foreseeable	future,	 fall	apart	
into	Westphalian	states	again.	
Auer	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 the	 attempt	 to	 continue	with	
the	 integration	process	 as	 before	 –	 i.e.	 to	move	 towards	
a more	federalist	Europe	with	a “post-national	citizenship”	
à	la	Habermas	(2001)	–	is	no	longer	feasible.	He	states	that	
populism	 and	 ethno-centric	 nationalism	 are	 emerging	 in	
Europe	 not despite	 but	 arguably	 in response	 to	 its	 elites’	





gration	 and	 address	 the	 appeal	 of	 populist	 politics.	 He	




ing	 integration	 theories	 could	 predict	 under	 what	 condi-
tions	the	EU	might	disintegrate,	suggests	that	the	future	of	
the	European	Union	 is	more	 contingent	upon	 the	 rise	of	
anti-European	 movements,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 Germany’s	
engagement	 than	most	 such	 theories	 allow.	 The	 unified	







assert	 its	 influence	 over	 EU	 policy,	 resentments	 against	
Germany	may	 increase	 in	other	member	states	which,	 in	
turn,	risks	strengthening	anti-European	forces.	
Antecedents and origins of Brexit
A significant	part	of	the	British	elite	–	raised	on	imperial	
tradition	with	a global	mindset	and	with	attitudes	deeply	
rooted	 in	 their	 specific	 political	 culture	 –	 could	 never	
embrace	European	integration	wholeheartedly,	or	confine	
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their	 ambitions	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 regional	 interests.	 The	
British	have	always	been	leading	advocates	of	free	trade;	in	
case	 the	 European	 cooperation	 exceeded	 this	 level,	 they	
either	 skipped	 it	 (e.g.	 Eurozone	 or	 Schengen)	 or	 tried	 to	
slow	it	down	(e.g.	in	common	budget	or	social	and	employ-
ment	policy	matters).	
Indeed, one of British businesses’ principal objectives 
with EU membership was to extend the UK’s liberalised 
model of capitalism into the European Union with the 
intention of open up new markets, especially before the 
country’s large companies and financial services indus-
try. In other fields, the British business relied upon the 
UK government’s capacity to defend the country’s 
deregulated markets and shape EU policies in line with 
its vested interest – e.g. by limiting the supranational 
up-regulation of labour standards (Lavery,	2017). 
When	the	UK	entered,	the	European	integration	already	
had	 had	 its	 own	 institutional	 arrangement,	 several	 com-
mon	 policies,	 e.g.	 common	 commercial	 and	 agricultural	
policies,	the	regulations	of	which	had	been	elaborated	and	
codified	 ignoring	 British	 interests	 completely.	 It	 soon	
became	 clear	 that	 the	 country	 could	 only	 continue	 its	
membership	 if	 granted	 special,	 exceptional	 rights	 in	 sev-
eral	 areas.	 Accordingly,	 although	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 is	









the	most	 exemptions	 in	 the	EU	 (Somai	 and	Biedermann,	
2016).
As	 for	 the	 deeper	 societal	 and	 economic	 reasons	






twenty	 years,	 been	 mitigated	 by	 the	 rebate	 secured	 by	
Margaret	Thatcher	at	 the	Fontainebleau	Summit	 in	1984,	
but	 started	 to	 deteriorate	 again	 (Figure	 1)	 following	 the	
decision	of	the	Blair	cabinet	–	at	the	December	2005	Sum-





UK’s operating/total balance in EU budget (euro million)
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Note: Operating budgetary balance does not take into account either administrative costs on the expenditure side, or traditional own resources 
(mainly customs duties) on the revenue side. As both administrative costs and the so-called Rotterdam effect are insignificant for the UK, it is 
relevant to calculate the total balance, too. 
Source: own calculations based on ”EU expenditure and revenue 2014-2020” - http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 
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The	third	factor	to	be	considered	here	was	the	gradual	
shift	 in	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 Europe	 since	 the	 German	




don	playing	 its	 traditional	 role	 to	keep	these	powers	bal-
anced.	 The	 fact	 that	 Germany	 emerged	 from	 the	 global	
crisis	 even	 stronger	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
Paris	 and	Berlin	 seemed	 to	have	been	 lost	 for	 long,	was	









we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 customs	 payments	 (European	
Commission,	2016).
The	 second	 reason	 behind	 Brexit	 was	 immigration	 
(Figure	2).	While	the	effects	of	inward	and	outward	migra-
tion	 flows	 more	 or	 less	 offset	 each	 other	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	during	most	of	the	20th	century,	the	number	of	
people	migrating	to	the	UK	has,	since	the	early	1990s,	con-
stantly	 surpassed	 that	 of	 emigrants.	 Immigration	 gained	
further	 momentum	 after	 the	 Eastern	 enlargement,	 net	
immigration	 reaching	 200	 thousand	 regularly	 every	 year	
since	 2004,	 and	 even	 300	 thousand	 between	 December	
2014	 and	 June	 2016	 –	 based	 on	 data	 of	 the	 last	 twelve	
months	 (Hawkins,	 2016,	pp.	 9-10)9. What	made	 the	mas-
sive	inflow	of	people	from	new	member	states	even	worse	
was	that	they	took	on	jobs	at	significantly	lower	wage	levels	
than	 local	people	or	 those	coming	 from	the	old	member	
states.	The	Eastern	enlargement	has	largely	added	to	the	




also	 certainly	 (regionally	 and	 depending	 on	 occupational	
groups)	displaced	local	nationals	from	their	jobs.	The	latter	











Total EU nationals Total non-EU nationals 
First Eastern 
enlargement 
(PL and others) 
European debt crisis + 
Viktor Orbán becomes 
Prime Minister of Hungary 
Free movement 
from RO (and BG) 
Note: After Eastern enlargement a great wave of Polish people migrated to the UK. In 2015, Poland overtook India as the most common non-UK 
country of birth leaving in the UK (916,000). The number of people arriving from Romania is growing very fast. In 2013, there were 94,000 
Romanians in the UK, in 2015 their number reached 223,000 and this country ranked first (with 182,000) as for its NINo (National Insurance 
number) registrations for the year ending March 2017 registrations. 
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK labour market: 2017 March https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/
employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/mar2017 
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designed	 to	 fit	 into	 German	 economic	 policy	 standards	
(ever	closer	union,	ever	more	austerity),	London	started	to	
face	 increasing	 pressure	 either	 to	 join	 the	 Eurozone	 in	















munity	 level.	The	British	people’s	adherence	 to	 the	 tradi-
tion	 of	 democratic	 accountability	was	 probably	 the	most	
important	argument	against	the	maintenance	of	member-
ship	 in	 an	ever	more	 integrated	European	Union	 (James,	
2016).
Finally,	one	can	add	a general	factor	behind	the	Brexit	
vote	 which	 stemmed	 from	 the	 increase	 of	 income	 and	
wealth	 inequalities.	 As	 globalisation	 reached	 the	 average	
British	 citizens,	 the	 production	 of	 goods	 they	 consumed	
shifted	to	a foreign	country	if	manufacturing	was	cheaper	
there,	and	if	 they	complained	about	 it	or	did	not	want	to	
take	 low-paid	 jobs,	 they	 were	 easy	 to	 be	 replaced	 with	
someone	 from	 abroad.	 The	 free	 outward	 movement	 of	
capital	and	inward	movement	of	labour	both	hit	the	aver-
age	British	citizens.	The	way	the	UK	government	(similarly	
to	 those	 in	most	other	developed	countries)	handled	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis	 –	 i.e.	 placing	 the	 burden	 of	 conse-
quences	on	 the	society	as	a whole,	 rather	 than	on	 those	
responsible	 –	 has	 not	 only	 further	 increased	 income,	
wealth	 (and	opportunity)	 inequalities,	but	has	also	 led	 to	
widespread	anti-elite	 sentiments.	 The	 referendum	on	EU	
membership	 was	 far	 from	 the	 mere	 technical	 issue	 of	
whether	staying	or	leaving	the	integration.	To	most	British	
citizens	it	was	a desperate	and	legitimate	answer	to	British	
and	 European	 (especially	 Brussels)	 elite	 politics	 that	 had	
discredited	themselves.	Will	the	elite	learn	from	the	result,	
will	they	reach	a reasonable	conclusion?	The	problem	they	
are	 in	 is	 a  Catch	 22	 situation:	 a  hard	Brexit	means	 even	
more	suffering	for	both	the	UK	and	the	EU,	but	a soft	one	









is	 unquestionably	 underway	 and	 those	 socio-economic	
processes	in	and	outside	Europe	that	strengthen	it,	will,	at	















The	most	 significant	 risk	associated	with	Brexit	 lies	 in	
the	potential	overestimating	by	negotiators	of	both	sides	




idiots	 for	 their	 decision	 to	 leave,	 and	 who	 therefore	
deserve	 to	 be	 humiliated	 and	 punished10.	 It	 was	 small	
wonder	that	the	first	signs	of	such	approach	–	being	at	the	
same	 time	hostile	and	 condescending,	 expressed	 in	high	
officials’	statements	 in	Brussels	and	member	states’	capi-




to	 international	 co-operation	 (like	 aviation,	 car	 industry,	
pharmaceutics	or	financial	services)	both	in	the	EU	and	the	
UK.
Of	course,	one	cannot	 forget	 that	 there	 is	 life	beyond	





tion	had	been	paid	 to	big	businesses.	At	 least,	 economic	
policy,	laws	and	regulations	had	increasingly	been	tailored	
to	 favour	 them,	while	 smaller	 businesses	 and	 a  growing	
part	of	the	population	were	having	a feeling	of	being	com-
pletely	abandoned13.	
With	 a  view	 to	 properly	 assessing	 the	 risks	 of	 a  cliff-
edge	 Brexit,	 let	 us	 consider	 two	 sectoral	 examples.	 The	
first	 one	 relates	 to	 the	 automotive	 industry,	 one	 of	 the	
most	 globally	 organised	 sectors	 of	 the	 British	 economy.	
While	 producing	 around	 1%	 of	 the	 country’s	 gross	 value	
added,	and	employing	0.5%	of	total	workforce,	it	accounts	
for	12%	of	total	UK	exports	of	goods,	and	invests	2.5	billion	
pounds	 in	R&D	 (2015	data).	 Should,	 in	 case	of	 a no	deal	




eral	 trade,	 the	 associated	 customs	 checks,	 alone	 costing	
100-150	euro,	would	cause	significant	delays	in	delivery	in	
an	 industry	 operating	 both	 lean	 and	 just-in-time	 proce-
dures.	Non-tariffs	barriers	such	as	administrative	burdens	
and	 compliance	 costs	would	 add,	 as	 a  conservative	 esti-
mate,	a further	6%	to	the	costs	(SMMT	2016).	




other	ones,	 “can	only	 take	 (re-)location	decisions	once	 in	
the	7-year	 life-cycle	of	a new	product”	 (PwC,	2016).	So,	 in	
the	 absence	 of	 a  comprehensive	 free	 trade	 deal,	 only	
a sector-specific	agreement	(e.g.	by	converting	production	
sites	into	customs	free	zones)	could	shield	the	car	industry	
from	 uncertainty	 and	 make	 sure	 the	 investment	 cycle	
remains	unbroken.	
The	other	sectoral	example	is	that	of	financial	services,	
an	 industry	 which	 constitutes	 7%	 of	 UK	 GDP,	 employing	
directly	1.1	million	people.	When	related	professional	ser-
vices	 –	 management	 consultancy,	 legal	 services	 and	




lion	 pounds.	 From	 their	 annual	 turnover	 of	 around	 200	
billion	 pounds	 45-48%	 relates	 to	 domestic	 business,	
20-25%	to	the	EU,	and	the	rest	to	rest	of	the	world.	They	
pay	over	60	billion	pounds	a year	 in	tax,	half	of	which	as	




















things	 stand	 today,	 the	UK	will	not	 remain	 in	 there,	 Lon-
don-based	business	will	 have	 to	 establish	 subsidiaries	 in	
another	EU	member	state	in	order	to	have	passport	rights.	
But	 this	 would	 be	 inefficient	 because	 of	 the	 increasing	
regulatory	complexity	and	the	requirement	for	the	banks	
to	 put	 additional	 liquidity	 behind	 the	 businesses	 (Ford,	
2017).	
The	 same	 holds	 true	 for	 other	 main	 issue:	 should	
Brussels	attempt	 to	re-patriate	euro-denominated	clear-
ing	 to	 the	 Eurozone,	 depriving	 the	 UK	 of	 tens	 of	 thou-
sands	of	 jobs,	 it	would	cost	banks	and	 investors	 tens	of	
thousands	 of	 billions	 of	 euros	 over	 a  5-year	 period,	 so	





of	 financial	 services	providers	 in	 an	environment	where	
all,	packaged	 together	and	 interconnected	 to	 the	extent	
that	businesses	get	 real	 scale	of	capital,	 skills	and	 infra-
structure,	 in	 brief,	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	 economies	 of	
scale	 (compare	 the	 statement	 of	 Wilmot-Sitwell,	 EMEA	
President,	Bank	of	America	Merrill	 Lynch	 Int,	one	of	 the	
witnesses	at	an	inquiry	on	“Brexit	and	financial	services	in	
the	UK”	held	on	14	September	2016	in	the	House	of	Lords	
Select	 Committee	 on	 the	 EU	 Financial	 Affairs	 Sub-Com-
mittee	(House	of	Lords,	2016c)).	
The	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 replicating,	 at	 least	 in	
the	short	term,	the	services	currently	provided	in	the	UK	–	
and	the	assumption	that	much	of	the	business	lost	by	the	
UK	 would	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 relocate	 to	 New	 York,	 the	
world’s	 second	 financial	 centre,	 than	 to	elsewhere	 in	 the	
EU	 –	 suggest	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	 in	 the	 EU’s	 economic	
interest	for	these	services	to	be	provided	less	efficiently	in	
a smaller	European	financial	centre	or	in	New	York	instead	
of	 London	 (House	 of	 Lords,	 2016a).	 So,	 perhaps	 for	 the	
sake	 of	 both	 parties,	 better	 would	 be	 to	 move	 towards	
globalisation,	in	a sense	of	accepting	that	it	is	a global	busi-
ness,	 and	 relying	 to	 more	 and	 more	 globally	 regulated	
equivalence	regimes15.	
Opportunities








“great	 union	 of	 nations”	making	 up	 the	 United	 Kingdom	









15Unia Europejska.pl Nr 2 (243) 2017









Challenges and opportunities related to Brexit: implications for the UK and the EU27 
UK EU27






- Common	 policies	 becoming	 national	 ones	 (commercial,	 CAP,	
cohesion,	R&D);
- Access	 to	 the	 Single	Market	 (financial	 services	 and	 automotive	
industry	included).














triggering	 political	 deadlock,	 legal	 battles	 or,	 ultimately,	
even	the	possible	breakup	of	the	UK.	If	this	risk	cannot	be	








EU27,	 it	deters	 them	to	put	at	risk	 their	relationship	with	
the	UK	(UK	Government	2017:19).	
Viewing	 from	 a  more	 positive	 angle,	 Brexit	 could	 be	
seen	as	an	opportunity	for	strengthening	intergovernmen-
tal	 collaboration	between	Westminster	 and	 the	devolved	
administrations,	 rather	 than	 driving	 the	 Union	 apart.	
Accordingly,	in	its	White	Paper	the	UK	government	hastens	
to	 commit	 that	 no	 decisions	 will	 be	 removed	 from	 the	
devolved	administration	and	when	it	will	be	about	to	repat-
riate	 competences	 from	 Brussels,	 the	 opportunity	 of	










Prime	 Minister’s	 speech	 in	 January	 2017	 and	 the	 White	
Paper	which	followed	in	February,	have	rejected	two	of	the	
broad	frameworks	considered	by	many	experts	as	options:	














are	 great	 complications	 in	 the	 services	 trade	 that	 most	
FTAs	do	not	 in	any	detail	 cover.	 Finally,	while	addressing	
tariff	barriers	within	an	FTA	could	be	relatively	straightfor-
ward,	notwithstanding	the	short	timescale	to	negotiate	an	











has,	 in	 recent	years,	developed	a considerable	 trade	sur-
plus	vis-à-vis	its	partner	(Figure	3).	
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According	to	mainstream	theories,	trade	is	not	a zero-
sum	game:	more	of	it	makes	us	all	more	prosperous.	Free	
trade	 between	 Britain	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 means	
more	trade,	and	more	trade	means	more	 jobs	and	more	













manufacturers,	 however,	 as	 employees,	 they	 can	 easily	
(the	 less	 skilled	 they	 are,	 the	more	 easily	 they	 can)	 lose	
their	jobs,	or	at	least	their	livelihood	can	become	increas-
ingly	precarious.	So,	it	seems	that	theories	do	not	take	into	
account	 the	 possible	 social	 (not	 to	mention	 the	 environ-
mental)	drawbacks	of	 international	trade.	So,	the	reshap-
ing	of	the	UK’s	commercial	relationship	with	the	EU	could,	










Commission	 says	 “sufficient	progress”	needs	 to	be	made	
before	 talks	can	move	onto	a post-Brexit	 trade	deal.	The	
big	question	for	the	EU	remains	whether	it	is	worth	punish-
ing	 the	 UK?	 For	 what?	 For	 a  decision	 mixing	 tradition,	
a global	mindset,	anti-globalism,	anti-elitism,	and	a feeling	
of	 being	 abandoned?	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 why	 such	
a  punishment	 would	 be	 counterproductive:	 first,	 the	 EU	
would,	 in	a number	of	 issues	 (e.g.	 trade	 in	goods,	 fishing	
quotas,	budgetary	contribution),	loose	at	least	as	much	in	
profit	or	jobs	as	the	UK;	second,	if	the	EU,	instead	of	seek-
ing	 for	 revenge,	 took	 a more	 generous	 attitude	 towards	
the	leaving	UK,	it	would	make	it	more	attractive	in	the	eye	
of	both	its	current	and	potential	member	states.	By	doing	
so,	Brussels	 could	 avoid	 a  situation	 in	which	 it	would	be	
seen	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a modern	Hudson	 Lowe	 against	
Napoleon,	but	under	a reverse	angle.	
Figure 3













1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
RoW EU 28 
Note: EU27 = EU28 minus the UK. RoW = Rest of the World.
Source: ONS, Who does the UK trade with? 21 February 2017, http://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk-trade-partners/ 
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opportunities	 related	 to	 disintegration	 in	 the	 European	 Union”	
given	at	 the	 conference	 “European	Economic	 Integration	Theory	
Revisited	Workshop”	supported	by	 the	European	Association	 for	
Comparative	Economic	Studies,	held	at	the	University	of	Szeged,	
Faculty	 of	 Economics	 &	 Business	 Administration	 on	 23rd-24th	
March	2017,	Szeged,	Hungary;	and	partly	on	the	author’s	 lecture	
“Brexit	 as	 a  trigger	 for	 disintegration:	 background	 and	 conse-
quences”	 given	 at	 the	 Second	 World	 Congress	 of	 Comparative	
Economics	 «1917–2017:	 Revolution	 and	 Evolution	 in	 Economic	
Development»	held	at	the	HSE	Campus	in	St.	Petersburg,	Russia,	
on	15–17	June,	2017.







tion,	 Legrain	 describes	 the	 threat	 that	 nationalist	 anti-establish-
ment	parties,	playing	already	a direct	role	in	governance	in	eight	
member	 states	 (Dennison	and	Pardijs,	 2016),	might	 capture	 fur-
ther	governments.






lands	 and	 Austria,	 having	 traditionally	 been	 pegging	 their	 own	
currencies	 to	 the	DM).	On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 coin,	 the	 same	
system	is	thus	a bane	to	the	periferial	countries	(France	included),	




partly	 explained	by	 the	existence	of	 a  “web of personal, business 
and political relationships, largely obscured from public view, that link 
Europe’s banking establishment with the political classes at national, 
regional and even local level”	 (Barber,	 2010);	 second,	 that	 those	
citizens	of	the	member	states	“who have deep economic and social 
ties with their counterparts across Europe and benefit from Europe 
materially and culturally account for no more than 10 to 15 per cent 
of the EU population”	(Fligstein,	2008,	referred	to	in	Webber,	2014).





closure	 of	 boundaries	 leaves	 micro-players	 no	 option	 than	 to	
voice	 when	 dissatisfied,	 internal	 cohesion	 not	 only	 makes	 the	
option	of	exit	less	profitable,	but	also	enhances	external	consoli-
dation	(Vollaard,	2008,	p.	19).
8	 If	 there	were,	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 a  democratic	 vote	 propor-
tional,	e.g.	to	member	states’	inhabitants,	France,	Italy	and	Spain	
together	 representing	more	 than	 51%	 of	 the	 zone’s	 population	
(Eurostat,	estimates	as	of	January	1st,	2016),	they	could	put	an	end	
to	austerity	and	vote	for	the	introduction	of	eurobonds.	









easily	 deceivable)	 ignorant	 people,	 and	 first	 of	 all	 would	 be	 an	
absolute	disaster	to	the	UK	if	it	came	true	(see	e.g.	the	open	letter	
of	Lord	Kerr	of	Kinlochard	et	al.,	2017).	
11	 See	UK	Prime	Minister	 Theresa	May’s	 so-called	 Lancester	
House	speech	in	early	2017,	threatening	to	transform	the	UK	eco-
nomic	modell	 in	order	 to	attract,	with	competitive	 tax	 rates,	 the	
world	best	companies	and	biggest	investors	in	case	of	a punitive	
deal	(May	2017).
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Intuitively	 we	 are	 prone	 to	 think	 that	 exchange	 rate	
volatility	 and	 related	 risk	 are	 important	barriers	 in	doing	
international	business.	In	practice	and	empirics,	there	are	
no	convincing	proofs	that	this	is	true	–	the	relation	between	
exchange	 rate	 risk	 and	 trade	 is	 seen	 as	 non-existing	 or	





tory	of	 the	 European	 integration	 and	 its	 sustainability	 as	
well	as	creation	of	many	institutions	which	were	designed	
to	 govern	 monetary	 integration.	 The	 irrevocably	 fixed	
exchange	 rate	 and	 formation	 of	 a  big	 economic	 area	 as	
a driver	 for	exports	was	also	supported	by	 the	new	con-
cept	called	the	endogeneity of optimum currency area	condi-
tions.	 According	 to	 Rose’s	 (2000)	 research	 on	 monetary	
unification	and	trade	and	in	view	of	an	extraordinary	effect	
of	 more	 than	 200%,	 scientists	 started	 to	 think	 that	 one	
country	 does	 not	 have	 to	 fulfil	 traditional	 optimum	 cur-
rency	 area	 conditions	 (flexibility	 of	 labour,	 similarity	 of	
economic	structure,	business	cycle	synchronisation,	etc.)	in	
order	to	adopt	the	euro.	One	should	rather	join	the	euro	
















in	 the	 total	 flow	 of	 trade	 does	 not	 preclude	 qualitative	
changes	 such	 as	 new	 products,	 their	 improved	 diversity	
and	quality	or	lower	prices	(Fontagné	et	al.,	2009;	Cieślik	et	
al.,	 2013).	 It	 means	 that	 no	 or	 small	 euro	 effect	 at	 the	
aggregate	 level	 could	be	accompanied	by	changes	at	 the	
micro	level	which	are	not	visible	in	general	data	because	of	
price	 compression	 due	 to	 the	 pro-competitive	 pressure	
ensuing	from	the	euro	introduction.	








monetary	 unification	 for	 trade.	 Rose	 and	 Stanley	 (2005),	
using	studies	on	the	euro	area	and	other	currency	unions	
in	their	meta-analysis,	claimed	that	the	monetary	unifica-
tion	 effect	 on	 trade	 ranges	 between	 30	 and	 90%4.	 But	
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